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ABSTRACT           JEL  J3, J7 
 
This study examines the role of individual characteristics, occupation, and workplace 
features accounting for differences in hourly earnings between male and female full-
time employees in the public and private sectors. Using new linked employee-
employer data for Britain in 2004, we find that the nature of the public private pay 
gap differs between genders and that of the gender pay gap differs between sectors. 
The analysis shows that essentially none of the gender earnings gap in both the public 
and private sector can be explained by differences in observable characteristics. 
Decomposition analysis further reveals that the contribution of differences in 
workplace characteristics to the public private earnings gap is sizeable and significant. 
Whilst the presence of performance related pay and company pension schemes is 
associated with higher relative earnings for those in the private sector, the key 
workplace characteristic for the public private pay gap is the presence of family-
friendly employment practices. Increased provision is associated with higher relative 
earnings in the public sector for both men and women.  
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The public sector wage bill is a matter of great concern to policy makers, contributing 
as it does to nearly 50% of government spending and employing a fifth of the total 
U.K. workforce. A significant part of the Chancellor's Comprehensive Spending 
Review is focused on public sector pay and implications for the public sector 
workforce in the long run.1 Concerns have also been expressed about recent increases 
in the public-private wage differential2 and the persistence of the gender earnings gap3.  
 
From a macroeconomic perspective the level and growth of public sector pay 
is of obvious importance. High public sector wages increasing at a relatively fast rate 
carry the risk of stimulating private sector wage demands and inflationary 
expectations. If indeed public sector wages are at a level which is appropriate given 
the characteristics of the employees and their workplaces (with respect to the private 
sector) then there is no strong imperative to increase public sector wages further, 
especially given the inflationary risk. 
 
There has been considerable research into analysing both the size of the 
public-private pay differential and its movements over time, and possible explanations 
for these phenomena. Most studies have based their analysis upon cross-sectional or 
longitudinal data which is rich in the description of worker attributes but meagre in 
respect of workplace characteristics4. If employers set wages in an environment where 
both employers and workers have a degree of bargaining power, then workplace 
characteristics that affect the value of the marginal product of labour may have an 
impact on the wage. These could include characteristics such as workplace size, 
                                                 
1 “I can assure you that through the vigilance of the Bank and our determination to ensure future public 
sector pay settlements are founded on our 2% inflation target, we will maintain our anti-inflation 
discipline,” (Gordon Brown, then Chancellor, cited in  The Guardian, June 21, 2006). 
2  “The ASHE figures [showing that median earnings for full time workers in the public sector rose 
4.1% to £475 a week in 2005 compared with 2.5% to £ 413 in the private sector] indicate that the 
Chancellor can now make a strong case for taking a tougher stance on public sector pay”. (John 
Philpott, Chief Economist at the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, cited in  The 
Guardian, November 11, 2005). 
3 The gender earnings gap in Britain has recently been placed firmly at the forefront of policy concern 
with the previous Prime Minister establishing a Women and Work Commission in 2004 to seek ways 
to tackle the gap. 
4 For example Trinder, 1997; Disney and Gosling, 1998 and 2003; Blackaby et al, 1999; Bender and 
Elliot, 1999; Yu et al, 2005; Luciflora and Meurs, 2006; Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2006; 
Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2005. 
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foreign ownership, industrial relations policies, and human resource management 
practices5 . 
 
This distinction between worker and workplace characteristics is important 
from an empirical perspective too, because, as Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) using the 
1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS90) show, incentive schemes 
which have a direct bearing on pay determination do vary across public and private 
sector workplaces. Similarly, Burgess and Ratto (2003) survey international evidence 
to further explore the impact of explicit incentives (and especially Performance 
Review Pay, PRP) in the public sector. They conclude that these practices are 
typically under utilised in the public sector. A strength of these studies is the 
recognition that workplace characteristics are not uniform across the sectors. The 
association between payment schemes such as these and the resultant public sector 
pay gap for individual employees can only be examined adequately with linked 
employee and workplace data. Similarly, we know that human resource management 
choices at the workplace (such as management structure, firm structure, employee 
involvement in decision making) in the workplace can have an impact on firm 
performance (Lazear, 2000) in both the private and public sectors (Dixit 1997; 
Simpson, 2006).  
 
A less well documented human resource management policy associated with 
firm performance is the presence of family friendly work practices. Pressures for the 
introduction of family-friendly practices in Britain are coming from many directions. 
Changes in the labour supply of women and the greater sharing of household non-
labour market work across parents (Gershuny, 2007, page 131) have led to an 
increased demand from workers (male and female) for family-friendly work life 
balance practices. From political quarters, there has been increased action at the 
European Union level pressing Member States to introduce legislation and foster 
policies, which aim to reconcile work and family life.  These efforts are intended to 
promote not only gender equality in the workplace (Equal Opportunity Commission, 
2006) but also greater quality care for children and dependents (Caracciolo, 2001).  
                                                 
5  Bhaskar and To (1999) and Bhaskar et al, (2002) analyse the complexities of wage setting in 
monopsony situations with free entry where productivity enhancing workplace characteristics do affect 
wages. 
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The British government has adopted a multi-pronged approach to encouraging 
development of family-friendly work environments 6 . The major plank in the 
Government’s programme is the Work-Life Balance campaign. This campaign 
includes a large scale public awareness component: producing and distributing 
information to individuals and firms concerning their legal entitlements and/or 
obligations7, ways family-friendly practices can be implemented, and the potential 
gains from doing so. Perhaps aided by these governmental programmes, firms are 
increasingly aware of advantages to implementing family-friendly policies, including 
reducing absenteeism and raising productivity (surveys are provided in Dex and 
Smith 2002; Equal Opportunity Commission, 2006; and Gray, 2002).    
 
 The literature on gender wage inequality is also well established (see surveys 
by Altonji and Blank, 1999; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebman, 2005)8. There is 
dispersion in the findings of these studies, nevertheless, it is generally concluded that 
whilst the gender gap has declined in the last two decades, a substantial and persistent 
earnings gap still exists between male and female employees in Britain. There is also 
a young, but growing, body of work on the gender pay gap that exploits linked 
evidence on both individual worker characteristics and those of their workplaces as an 
additional feature to help explain the earnings gap9.  Typically, these studies show 
that the earnings gap differs across workplaces and that it differs with identifiable 
workplace characteristics. This suggests that including workplace information in the 
modelling of individual earnings allows for a more precise calculation of the 
explained part of the earnings gap 
 
Given the theoertical literature and empirical evidence summarised above, 
there is good reason to suppose that including relevant  workplace characteristics in 
                                                 
6 These include the National Childcare Strategy, extended maternity and paternity entitlements, the 
minimum wage, the New Deal for Lone Parents, and the new Working Families Tax Credit. 
7 “Women can claim that a refusal to allow flexibility [family friendly work practices] indirectly 
discriminates against them. This is on the basis that a requirement to work full-time, for example, is 
likely to impact on women as the primary carer of dependents. Men can claim unlawful discrimination 
if their request to work flexibly is treated less favourably than a similar request by a female colleague.” 
(Equal Opportunity Commission, 2006 http://www.eoc.org.uk/default.aspx?page=15407 as cited on 
July 4, 2007). 
8 Recent results for Britain include Joshi and Paci (1998), Mumford and Smith (2007), Manning and 
Robinson (2004) and Manning and Petrongolo (2006). 
9 Groshen, 1991; Holzer and Neumark, 2000; Abowd et al, 2001; Drolet, 2002; Bayard et al, 2004; 
Anderson et al, 2001; Manning and Petrongolo, 2004; Mumford and Smith, 2007; Reilly et al, 2006; 
Hellerstein et al, 2007. 
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addition to the standard variables capturing human capital is likely to produce richer 
insight into the public private and gender pay differentials. In this paper, we use data 
from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04) to carry out 
such an analysis. WERS04 is a nationally representative survey of both workplaces 
and their employees to explore the impact of workplace characteristics on pay 
determination and the public-private wage gap for men and women. The linked nature 
(and extensive questionnaires) of the WERS04 data allows us to control far more 
extensively for both individual employee characteristics and workplace characteristics 
than has been possible in previous earnings studies. A further attractive feature of the 
WERS04 data, of particular relevance to our study, is the extensive information it 
provides on both public and private sector workplaces (Kersley et al, 2006, page 5). 
 
Most studies that concentrate on the public-private wage differential issue rely 
on the human capital model as the theoretical basis for the study of earnings (Becker 
1975).  This approach is also used as the starting point in this paper. At the employee 
level, it is assumed that wages increase with (marginal) productivity which in turn 
increases with measures of accumulated skills such as education, work experience, 
and training. The Human Capital approach is necessarily partial. By using linked 
workplace-worker data, we are able to explore the additional role workplace 
characteristics have in the wage determination process and on the public-private wage 
differential in Britain to a greater extent than has been done previously in the existing 
literature.  
 
1. Data 
The data used in this study are drawn from the British Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey 2004 (WERS04) 10 . WERS04 is a nationally representative survey of 
workplaces and their employees, where a workplace comprises the activities of a 
single employer at a single set of premises. Face-to-face interviews for WERS04 were 
conducted with a senior manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee 
relations). At those workplaces responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire 
was presented to 25 randomly selected employees (in workplaces with more than 5 
                                                 
10Department of Trade and Industry (2006). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 
2004 (computer file). 5th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor). SN: 5294. 
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employees) or to all the employees (in workplaces with fewer than 26 employees). 11  
The entire surveying process resulted in 2,295 completed workplace surveys, with 
22,451 completed employee questionnaires from 1,733 of these workplaces. 
 
WERS04 is a stratified random sample, and larger workplaces and some 
industries are over-represented. In this paper the data have been weighted throughout 
the analyses to allow for the complex survey design and are thus representative of the 
sampling population12. All of the empirical results that follow use workplace and 
employee sampling weights simultaneously.  
 
 WERS04 and its predecessors have been used to analyze diverse research 
questions (Millward et al. 2004), but we are not aware of any research using these 
data to explicitly examine the earnings gap between public sector and private sector 
male and female full-time employees in Britain. Retaining only those individuals who 
have complete information for the variables used in the analyses below leaves us 
10,600 full-time employees; 2,903 in the public sector and 7,697 in the private sector. 
 
2. Measuring the earnings gaps  
Full definitions of the variables to be used in the study are presented in Table 1. 
Summary statistics for these variables are in Tables 2 for the full data sample, male 
and female employees, and public and private sector employees in aggregate, 
respectively. Summary statistics for the sub-samples of primary interest to this study 
(public sector male, private sector male, public sector female, and private sector 
female full-time employees) are presented in Table 3.  
 
 A full-time employee is defined to be working 37 or more hours per week, 
which is a standard full-time working week in the public sector and a reasonable 
assumption for the more variable definition of full-time in the private sector (Manning 
                                                 
11 The industries excluded from the survey were agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; mining and 
quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organisations and bodies. 
12 The advantages from using weighted complex survey design data is discussed at length in Deaton 
(1998) and by the suppliers of the WERS data series (see footnote above). When weighted accordingly, 
the data are representative of all workplaces with 5 or more employees, located in Great Britain, and 
engaged in activities within sectors D (Manufacturing) to O (Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services) of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2003. The data, suitably weighted, are 
therefore also representative of all employees within these workplaces. 
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and Petrongolo, 2004). The public sector (as defined by the suppliers of the data set13) 
employs 27.4 per cent of full-time employees in Britain (Table 1): 22.2 per cent of the 
males and 35.8 per cent of the females. 
 
 The measure of earnings used is average hourly earnings for each employee. 
This is calculated by dividing the employee’s gross (before tax and other deductions) 
weekly wages by the hours they usually work each week (including any overtime and 
extra hours). Whilst usual hours worked is a continuous measure, the survey 
responses for gross weekly wages are banded in the data set. There are 14 bands and 
the midpoints of these bands are used. On this measure, public sector employees earn, 
on average, 14 log per cent (or log wage points) more than private sector employees 
(see Table 2). Full-time male earnings are, on average, also 14 log per cent (or log 
wage points) above full-time female average earnings (see Table 2). These similarly 
sized aggregate earnings gap may, however, camouflage quite different earnings gaps 
between sectors and genders.  
 
 This paper is specifically concerned with comparing male and female public 
sector and private sector full-time employees, implying that there are a range of 
earnings gaps to consider (see Figure 1 and Table 3). For example, within genders but 
across sectors, the public sector to private sector gap for men is 11.7 log per cent in 
terms of mean log hourly wages; this is only half as big as the public sector to private 
sector gap for women (which is 24.3 log per cent). Within sectors but across genders 
the differences are even larger: the male public sector to female public sector gap is 7 
log per cent, whilst the male private sector to female private sector gap is almost three 
times bigger (at 19.6 log per cent).  
 
 
                                                 
13 A public sector workplace is one where the best description of the formal status of the establishment 
(or the organisation of which it is a part) is that it is a: government owned limited company; 
nationalised industry; public service agency; other non-trading public corporation; quasi autonomous 
national government organisation (QUANGO); or local/central government (including the National 
Health Service and Local Education Authorities).   
A private sector workplace is one where the best description of the formal status of the establishment 
(or the organisation of which it is a part) is that it is a:  public limited company (PLC); private limited 
company; company limited by guarantee; partnership (including limited liability partnership/ self-
proprietorship.); trust/charity; body established by Royal Charter; or co-operative/mutual/friendly 
society. 
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3. The determinants of earnings 
3.1 Individual characteristics 
Most authors have adopted the human capital model as the theoretical basis for the 
earnings function (an extensive recent survey was provided Chiswick, 2003). This 
approach will also be used here. At the individual employee level, it is assumed that 
wages increase with measures of accumulated skills such as education, work 
experience, and training.  
 
 WERS04 provides information as to the highest level of education the 
individual has received across a range of educational categories. Just over a quarter of 
full-time employees have a degree or postgraduate qualification whilst nearly 60 per 
cent have no post-age 16 qualifications (Table 2).  The public sector employs more 
highly educated workers than does the private sector, and women are substantially 
less likely than men to have the lowest education levels. 
 
 Measures of work experience are usually assumed to be positively related to 
wages via the ability to acquire skills over the time period the employee has spent 
working. Typically, cross-sectional studies do not have data on the history of actual 
lifetime work experience across firms for individuals. Instead proxies are provided, 
the most common of which is potential experience: the age of the individual minus 
years spent in education. This may lead to an underestimate of the relationship 
between work experience and earnings if the individual was not actually employed 
during substantial parts of their life (such as the long-term unemployed or mothers 
who have taken time out of the labour force to care for their children). WERS04 also 
does not have information on actual experience over working life; potential 
experience (age minus education and infant years) is used instead and the results need 
to be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
 
 The length of the time the employee spent in employer-provided training in 
the previous year is also included in the dataset; this measure of training is expected 
to be positively related to wages (Hashimoto, 1981; Almeida-Santos and Mumford, 
2005). Training periods are some 50 per cent higher in the public sector, they are also 
a little (around 10 per cent) higher for women.  
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 The earnings function is augmented with the inclusion of further categories of 
explanatory variables capturing individual employee characteristics such as 
demographic variables (which may constrain an individual’s choice of jobs including 
the presence of dependent children, marital status, ethnic identification, and physical 
disability); individual job characteristics (being on a fixed term contract, and union 
membership); and occupation. 
 
 Considering the demographic variables in more detail, just over a third of 
British full-time employees have at least one dependent child (Table 2), more so for 
males (42 per cent) than females (25 per cent). Close to two thirds of employees are 
partnered or married (again more so for males, 71 per cent, than females, 61 per cent). 
There are more private sector employees who consider themselves to be of a non-
white ethnic background (6 per cent) than public sector employees (4 per cent); with 
little difference across the genders. Finally, a substantial proportion of the workforce 
has an ongoing physical disability (12 per cent of the men and 11 per cent of the 
females). 
 
 Amongst the individual job characteristics, some 3 per cent of employees are 
hired on fixed term contracts, reflecting a more insecure employment future. These 
employment contracts are more common in the public sector (4 per cent) than in the 
private sector (2 per cent) but not significantly different across the genders. Current 
job tenure (uncompleted spells) is on average 5.2 years (5.5 for men and 4.6 for 
women). Tenure is also higher in the public sector (5.9 per cent) than in the private 
sector (5 per cent). Current job tenure is expected to be positively related to wages 
primarily because it reflects a successful match between employee and employer 
(Mumford and Smith, 2004). Returns to current job length have often been found to 
be very small and the major action with this variable in the literature appears to be 
capturing the wage gains associated with changing jobs (Manning and Robinson, 
2004). 
 
 Union membership has declined dramatically in Britain since the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, in 2004 it was still substantial at 32 per cent of full-time employees 
representing a potentially major source of bargaining power (in 1998 it was 39 per 
cent). Union membership rates are very similar across the genders but are very much 
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higher in the public sector (69 per cent) than in the private sector (21 per cent). The 
union may provide a voice mechanism for the individual thereby leading to less quits, 
longer tenure and higher wages (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Booth and Chatterji 
1998, Chatterji 2007). Unions may also, however, provide a range of other services to 
their members, which could increase relative job satisfaction and reduce the wage. On 
balance, a positive relationship between union membership and the wage is expected. 
 
 Occupational choice, at an individual level, is often treated in much the same 
way as educational outcome since they both reflect a range of variables, especially 
individual ability and opportunity (Filer, 1986). Occupational choice may also be 
constrained. In general, those occupations typically associated with higher skills 
(professional, technical, clerical) are more likely to occur in the public sector. (With 
the exception of the highly skilled managers, who are also more likely to be employed 
in the private sector.) Analogously, the lower skilled occupations (crafts, personal 
services, sales, operative and assembly workers and the unskilled) are more likely to 
be employed in the private sector. In aggregate, women are less likely to be managers, 
professionals, craftsmen, operative and assembly workers, or unskilled. They are 
much more likely to be employed in the technical, clerical, personal services, or sales 
occupations. 
 
3.2 Workplace characteristics 
A range of workplace characteristics are included in the analyses, which may be 
considered in groups: structural conditions; employment conditions; and industrial 
relations measures.  
 
 Structural conditions are captured by: workplace size, if the workplace is 
foreign controlled, regions and, of course, by public or private sector (discussed 
above). British workplaces are dominated by small workforces, however, large 
workplaces employ a disproportionately large number of total employees (Kersley et 
al, 2006; page 13). This is reflected in the large average sizes reported in Table 2. On 
average, private sector workplaces have 355 employees, whilst public sector 
establishments are some three times larger. Females, on aggregate, tend to work in 
larger workplaces.  
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 The measures of employment conditions include: if employees receive 
performance based pay; if the workplace has pension provision; the extent of team 
working, if any of the workforce operate in quality circles; if employees have a lot of 
discretion over their work; if employee briefing systems are in place; and the 
availability of family-friendly work practices.  
 
 Performance related pay is not surprisingly much more common in the private 
sector than the public sector (Burgess and Ratto, 2003) and is slightly more common 
amongst males than females. A positive relationship between earnings and 
performance related pay is expected as employees typically respond positively to the 
incentive effects associated with such a pay system (Lemieux et al, 2007).  The 
relationship between productivity and pension provision is complex (see Disney et al, 
2004), nevertheless, there is a strong positive correlation between high paying jobs 
and access to occupational pension plans in Britain (see Disney et al, 2004; page 244). 
 
 Team working may be particularly important for efficient outcomes in the 
public sector where monitoring worker effort may be more difficult than it is in the 
private sector (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; page 289). It may also be that the interaction 
between team members allows for greater skill transmission and increased 
productivity in both sectors (Hamilton et al, 2003).  
 
 Operating in quality circles, having a lot of discretion over how work tasks are 
carried out and an effective employee briefing system are all characteristics of a 
management structure that facilitates employee-employer interactions and employee 
responsibility for outcomes. A positive relationship is predicted between such policies 
and average earnings (Simpson, 2006; Burgess and Ratto, 2003). 
 
 An index of family friendly work practices is used in this study ranging from 
zero to six depending on how many of the following practices are available: paternity 
leave with full normal weekly pay; maternity leave with full normal weekly pay; 
home working; job sharing; child care; and/or paid family leave. 
 
As discussed in Budd and Mumford (2004) an important influence on the 
design of work policies and benefits has traditionally been the norm of the “ideal” 
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worker who works full-time and leaves unpaid household work to someone else 
(Williams 2000). Family-friendly corporate policies can be divided into two 
categories based on what weight, if any, they assign to that traditional norm (Bailyn 
1993; Bailyn et al, 2001).  One category provides services to help employees fulfil the 
standards of the ideal worker (such as subsidized or on-site child care). The other 
category is comprised of benefits that allow employees flexibility to deviate from the 
model of the ideal worker to better balance work and family concerns. 
 
One major subcategory within this second group of family-friendly benefits is 
leave policies.  In Britain, there is an explicit distinction between maternity leave (a 
woman taking leave to give birth and care for a newborn child), paternity leave (a 
father taking leave around the birth of a new child), and parental leave (leave for the 
purpose of taking care of a child).  Employers are able to offer more generous benefits 
than those mandated 14 , in both compensation and time allowed off, and these 
additional leave policies are an important category of employer-sponsored family-
friendly policies. Comprising a second subcategory of family-friendly policies that 
allow deviations from the ideal worker norm are policies that change the regular work 
schedule.  One major example is job sharing initiatives in which (typically) two 
employees work part-time to share the responsibilities and total hours of one full-time 
position.  Finally, in a third class of "norm-defying" family-friendly policies are those 
providing work site flexibility.  Most prominent among these are policies that allow 
workers to telecommute and work at home. The use of an index to capture family 
friendly work practices is commonly used to capture the multi-faceted aspects of these 
policies. Budd and Mumford (2003), using WERS98, find positive payoffs in terms of 
workplace performance indicators and lower levels of employee absenteeism for 
workplaces with higher values of this index. A positive relationship is also expected 
between family friendly work practices and earnings. 
 
 The summary statistics in Table 2 reveal quite different levels of the measures 
of employment conditions. With the exception of performance related pay, females 
                                                 
14 Starting in April 2003, and covering the time period when the WERS04 data were collected, all 
pregnant employees were entitled to 26 weeks of maternity leave paid at the lower of : the statutory 
rate; or 90% of their normal gross weekly wage. Similar provisions applied to adoptive leave. Two 
weeks of paternity leave, paid at a statutory rate, was also mandated. Moreover, male and female 
employees were entitled to 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave to be used over the first five years of the 
child’s life. 
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are more likely to say they are available to them (although often this difference is not 
substantial and is indeed equally as likely for quality circles). The public sector is also 
more likely to offer these employment conditions than the private sector, again with 
the exception of performance related pay. 
 
 Finally, amongst the workplace characteristics are measures of the industrial 
relations practices at the workplace: if there is collective bargaining; if there are equal 
opportunities provisions; and if there are formal grievance procedures. Whilst males 
and females report similar averages for the presence of these measures, they are much 
more likely to occur in the public sector than in the private.  
 
3.3 Within sector differences in characteristics across the groups of employees 
Considering sector differences within gender in more detail (Table 3), the findings 
discussed above are still typically true. For example, public sector employees have 
more potential experience ceteris paribus, as do males. They are more likely to have a 
dependent child and so on. 
 
 Amongst those mean characteristics that reveal differences within gender and 
sector is the ethnic mix, 4 per cent of all public sector employees regardless of gender 
consider themselves to be from an ethnic background. In the private sector these 
figures are higher at 6 per cent for men and 8 per cent for women. Union membership 
can now also be seen to be consistently lower for private sector and female employees, 
with only 16 per cent of women employed in the private sector having current 
membership. Similarly amongst occupations, females in the public sector are clearly 
the least likely to be managers of the four categories of employees; in the private 
sector there is little difference between the proportion of males and females who are 
managers. In contrast, female public sector employees are much more likely to be 
professionals (with females in the private sector being least likely). 
 
 There is very little difference across genders in the measures of employment 
conditions discussed above; Table 3 reveals that these differences are essentially 
related to the sector the workplace occurs in. This is also typically the case for the 
industrial relations measures, with the exception of collective bargaining where, 
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within sectors, females are less likely to employed in workplaces with these 
characteristics. 
 
4. Estimation of the earnings functions 
Using semi-logarithmic wage equations, the earnings equation is estimated as: 
i i k i= + X + ZW α β γ ε+     (1) 
where Wi is the natural log of the wage for individual i;  α is the intercept term;  Xi is a 
vector of regressors measuring a range of individual characteristics; workplace k 
characteristics are measured in the vector of regressors kZ ; and ε i  is a residual term.  
 
 We estimate models separately for each of the groups of employees, public 
sector males and females and private sector males and females. Pooling of models for 
males and females is a common approach (see Bayard et al, 2003, for example). We 
take the view, however, that models for male and female public sector and private 
sector employees may be more likely to produce different parameters than those for 
all employees. This is borne out in the results shown below.  
 
 Robustness of the estimation results is of clear concern. The nature of the 
earnings data in WERS04 presents an issue for the construction of the earnings series 
employed in this paper. As noted above, the earnings data in WERS04 is banded. As 
Stewart (1983) discusses, it is possible, in principle, that this banding may affect the 
properties of the ordinary least squares estimates of the earnings function that we 
estimate. In unreported results (available from the authors) we provide a full set of 
estimates employing the appropriate (and suitably weighted) interval regression 
method. Comparison of the estimates confirms that interval estimates are very similar 
to the ordinary least squares estimates. We therefore concentrate our analysis on the 
ordinary least squares estimates15. 
 
                                                 
15 A further issue concerns unobservable heterogeneity in true worker quality. Nickel and Quintini 
(2002), using evidence from age 10 and 11 test scores from the National Child Development Survey 
(NCDS) and the New Earnings Survey (NES), argue that a decline in public sector relative to private 
sector pay adversely affects the quality of males in the public sector, but not females. Their paper 
emphasises the need to control fully for the individual characteristics of public sector employees, but 
also raises the question of why the different genders may respond differently to the characteristics of 
public sector workplaces. 
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5. Estimation Results 
 
The estimates of the earnings function for each of the four groups of employees are 
presented in Table 4. These are the estimates public sector male, public sector female, 
private sector male and private sector female full-time employees, respectively. In 
each case we estimate the models with ordinary least squares, fully allowing for the 
complex survey design of the data set and the need to weight accordingly. The 
standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity of an unknown form in the 
residuals. All estimates employ complex survey weights (as discussed above). Overall, 
the parameter estimates are generally well defined and have the expected sign. 
 
 Reading across the columns in table 4, the return to potential experience is 
higher in the private sector and they are higher for women within the sectors. We 
expect the returns from experience for women to be biased downwards as the measure 
of experience used is likely to overestimate the time they actually spent in 
employment. Current job tenure is rewarded similarly for men and women across 
sectors. The returns from education are higher for men than women across sectors, 
and higher in the public sector than in the private sector within gender. Postgraduate 
females in the private sector have a rate of return which is some 50 per cent lower 
than postgraduate males in the public sector. There is no significant evidence of men 
receiving higher earnings associated with recent training, unlike women in both 
sectors where a relative small impact is found. Vocational qualifications are similarly 
only significantly related to earnings for women. 
 
 Of the remaining individual characteristics, being married and having a 
dependent child are only associated with higher earnings for men. In contrast, having 
a dependent child is linked to lower wages for females in the private sector. Being on 
a fixed-tern contract or a union member is not related to earnings for any of the four 
types of employees.  
 
 The returns to occupation (relative to the omitted craft category) are 
substantially higher for females than males, and there is not a clear pattern in these 
returns across the sectors. In the public sector, highly skilled occupations are 
relatively poorly rewarded for men but well rewarded for women (with female 
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managers receiving almost twice the return than the male managers in this sector, and 
almost three times as much for professionals). Amongst the lower skilled occupations 
there is little difference across the sectors in returns, but males are seen to be more 
heavily penalised than females. 
 
 Considering the workplace characteristics, there are few characteristics shown 
to be significantly related to wages in the public sector. This may be due to a lack of 
variability in these characteristics across these workplaces. An exception is the 
availability of family friendly work practices which has a similar sized significant 
positive relationship for all the groups except for men in the public sector.  
Performance related pay and pensions provision are strongly related to higher 
earnings in the private sector, as is team working to a lesser extent. Collective 
bargaining is only associated with higher pay for male private sector employees.  
 
 Regional measures are included in the models essentially as additional 
structural controls, unsurprisingly, employees in the London area receive substantially 
higher wages and this impact is similar across sectors and genders. For men there is 
also some gain from living in the south-east (and also the east of England in the 
private sector). 
  
6. Decomposing the earnings gaps 
The estimates we have for the four groups of employees allow us to examine a 
number of earnings gaps. The approach we adopt to apportion the gap in the mean 
earnings of any two groups is that discussed in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).  In 
general, the decomposition of the mean earnings gap between groups of employees a 
and b is calculated as: 
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ{( ) ( ) } { ( ) ( )}a b a b a a b a b a b b a bW W X X Z Z X Zβ γ β β γ γ− = − + − + − + −          (2) 
In this calculation  captures the impact of the difference in the 
individual characteristics weighted by the parameters from the model for group a,  
captures the impact of the difference in the characteristics of the 
workplaces where groups a,b work, again weighted by the parameters from the model 
for group a and  is the remaining unexplained gap. The 
decompositions are presented in Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1 lays out the four sub-samples of concern (public sector male, private 
sector male, public sector female and private sector female). Each total bilateral 
earnings gap is presented next to an arrow indicating the direction of the comparison. 
Thus, the earnings gap between male public sector and male private sector full-time 
employees in Britain is 11.8 log per cent (or log wage points). This earnings gap can 
be decomposed into the component explained by differences in the mean values of 
their individual characteristics which make up the major component of 8.64 log 
percentage points (or 73% of the raw gap); differences in the mean values of their 
occupational characteristics which make up 2.58 log percentage points (22%); 
differences in the mean values of their workplace characteristics which make up a 
further 2.49 log percentage points (21%); and an unexplained component of –1.96 log 
percentage points (17%). The four components summing to the earnings gap of 11.8 
log per cent. The contribution of the differences in the characteristics (individual, 
occupational and workplace) is evaluated using the parameters from the model for the 
higher earnings group (a in equation 2). The unexplained component results from 
differences in the parameters for the two groups evaluated at the mean vales of the 
individual characteristics for the lower wage group (b in equation 2). 
 
 The earnings gap between public sector and private sector male employees is 
therefore due to the former having more productive characteristics (or at least 
characteristics that are more likely to be associated with higher pay) especially 
individual characteristics. Indeed, the size and sign of the negative unexplained 
component suggests that not only do males working in the private sector have less 
productive characteristics on average than do males in the public sector; they are also 
being relatively over-rewarded for their characteristics.  
 
 Similar analyses can be carried out for the three other bilateral earnings gaps16 
presented in Figure 1. In aggregate, across-sector but within-gender comparisons 
reveal that public sector employees are more likely to have individual characteristics 
                                                 
16 The fifth bilateral gap, not included in Figure 1, is that between male public sector and female private 
sector employees. Unsurprisingly, given the information in Figure 1, the earnings gap between these 
employees is 31.3 log percent, differences in the mean values of their: individual characteristics make 
up 13.31 log percentage points (or 43%); occupational characteristics make up 1.01 log percentage 
points (3%); workplace characteristics a further 2.0 log percentage points (6%); and the unexplained 
component is 15.01 log percentage points (48%).   
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associated with high pay 17 . They are also more likely to work in high paid 
occupations and in workplaces with high paying characteristics. Finally, the 
unexplained components in the earnings gaps are different is size but similar in 
relative scale (16.6 per cent of the raw gap for males and 19.3 per cent for females), 
however, male private sector employees are over rewarded for their characteristics 
whilst female private sector employees are under rewarded18 . 
 
 Across-gender but within-sector analysis shows that males are more likely to 
have individual characteristics associated with higher pay (although the extent of this 
distribution is not as strong as across public and private sectors); females are more 
likely to work in occupations and workplaces with higher paying characteristics; and 
there are substantial unexplained components in the gender pay gaps (more than 
100% in the public sector and 81% in the private sector). 
 
An important policy response in these cases could be more effective 
application of equal pay legislation. Strictly speaking, equal pay policies might only 
be applied to jobs that obviously have the same characteristics; however, the Equal 
Pay Act that was passed in Britain in 1970 included a broad concept of equity 
allowing for some comparisons between jobs typically performed by women and jobs 
typically performed by men. We find substantial within-sector, within-occupation 
earnings gap which should have been amenable to such an equal pay policy response.  
The new Gender Equality Duty (GED) is a statutory duty which came into force in 
April 200719 may be shown to be more effective in the future.  According to the GED, 
all public authorities in Britain must demonstrate that they are promoting equality for 
women and men and that they are eliminating sexual discrimination and harassment20.  
                                                 
17 8.86 log percentage points of the 11.8 log per cent gap for males, or 73%, and 8.78 log percentage 
points of the 24.3 log percent gap for females, or 36%. 
18 By 4.68 log percentage points or 19% of the 24.3 log per cent gap.  
19 “The gender equality duty comes into force in April 2007 and is the biggest change in sex equality 
legislation in thirty years, since the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act itself. It has been 
introduced in recognition of the need for a radical new approach to equality – one which places more 
responsibility with service providers to think strategically about gender equality, rather than leaving it 
to individuals to challenge poor practice.” Jenny Watson. (Chair, Equal Opportunities Commission. 
November 2006 cited in Equal Opportunities Commission 2006b, page 2). 
20 The Equality Act 2006 amends the Sex Discrimination Act to place a statutory duty on all public 
authorities, when carrying out their functions, to have due regard to the need:  to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination and harassment; and to promote equality of opportunity between men and women. This 
is known as the 'general duty’ and will come into effect on 6 April 2007. The duty applies to all public 
authorities in respect of all of their functions.  (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006b, pages 4 to 7). 
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 The decomposition results (Figure 1) show that the nature of the public private 
pay gap differs between genders and that of the gender pay gap differs between 
sectors. Whilst the public private pay gap for men is substantial, we show that it can 
be explained by weighted differences in the means of the variables that determine 
earnings. This is in contrast with the public private earnings gap for women where 
more than one fifth of the gap remains unexplained.  
 
 When examining within sector gender gaps, the situation is very different. The 
raw gender earnings gap in the private sector is almost 20 log per cent, nearly three 
times that in the public sector. In both cases this raw gender gap is essentially 
unexplained in the results presented here. Whilst these gender gaps remain 
unexplained, we can say that a large proportion of the difference between the gender 
pay gaps within the public and private sectors is due to women in the public sector 
being paid substantially more than those in the private sector. As discussed above, 
most of this within sector gap can be explained but a substantial part remains 
unexplained. 
 
 The contribution of differences in workplace characteristics to the public 
private earnings gap is substantial and significant. Of these, structural factors appear 
unimportant, contributing less than 0.5 log percentage points of the gap for males or 
females. Industrial relations measures contribute 2.2 log percentage points for men 
and 1.3 log percentage points for women; the presence of collective bargaining being 
the most important. Finally, employment conditions contribute a substantial 3.8 log 
percentage points for women and 0.9 log percentage points for men.  
 
 The presence of performance pay and a pension scheme are associated with 
higher earnings in the private sector for men and women. In both cases this is because 
                                                                                                                                            
The specific duties include to: prepare and publish a gender equality scheme; in formulating its overall 
objectives, to consider the need to include objectives to address the causes of any gender pay gap; to 
gather and use information on how the public authority's policies and practices affect gender equality in 
the workforce and in the delivery of services; to consult stakeholders (i.e. employees, service users and 
others, including trade unions) and take account of relevant information in order to determine its 
gender equality objectives; to assess the impact of its current and proposed policies and practices on 
gender equality; to implement the actions set out in its scheme within three years; and to report against 
the scheme every year and review the scheme at least every three years.  
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there is higher incidence in the private sector, confirming Burgess and Melcalfe 
(1999), which reduces the earnings gap by 0.4 and 0.3 log percentage points for men 
and women, respectively. In addition, we find that the returns to these characteristics 
are higher in the private sector, further attenuating the public private earnings gap.  
 
 The key workplace characteristic for the earnings gap, however, is the 
presence of family-friendly work practices. The higher incidence of these practices in 
the public sector contributes 4.8 log percentage points to the female and 1.3 log 
percentage points to the male public private earnings gaps. In the case of men, this 
effect is more than offset by a difference in the returns to the presence of family 
friendly work policies. The earnings of men in the private sector are more positively 
associated with their presence providing a further attenuation of the public private 
earnings gap. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The raw public private earnings gap for full-time employees in Great Britain is, on 
average, some 14 log per cent. This figure hides important compositional detail. The 
gap for male employees is less than half that for females. Another way of presenting 
this fact is that the gender earnings gap is three times larger in the private sector than 
it is in the public sector. The results in this paper show that whilst much of the public 
private earnings gap for males can be explained by individual characteristics, 
occupation and workplace features, a substantial proportion of the gap for females 
remains unexplained. This is consistent with the finding that essentially the entire raw 
average gender earnings gap in either the public or private sectors remains 
unexplained after the analysis.  
 
 The possibility of including workplace information in the modelling of 
individual earnings allows for a more precise calculation of the explained part of the 
earnings gap. This paper shows that workplace features play an additional important 
role in the determination of individual earnings. Features expected to raise 
productivity in the workplace are shown to also increase individual earnings. Earnings 
are also positively influenced by the presence of performance related pay schemes and, 
importantly, the presence of family friendly work policies. The increased use of 
performance related pay in the private sector raises earnings there relative to the 
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public sector, although not to a large extent. The increased presence of family friendly 
work policies in the public sector is significantly associated with higher earnings in 
the public sector, the more so for females. This largely contributes to the explained 
part of the public private earnings gap.  
 
 The explained part of the gender earnings gap in the private sector is due 
mostly to differences in the values of individual characteristics. However, more than 
four fifths of the gap remains unexplained. In the public sector the impact of a higher 
number of females in higher paid occupations offsets the impact of differences in 
individual characteristics leaving all of the raw gender earnings gap unexplained. The 
fact that the raw gap is much smaller than in the private sector suggests that the 
employment policy environment in the public sector is more conducive to higher 
relative female earnings. 
 
 The major component of the earnings gap between full-time men and women 
in Britain is associated with the gender effect. This finding suggests that the Equal 
Pay legislation in Britain has not been fully effective in either the public or the private 
sector. The recently introduced Gender Equality Duty adopts a new approach by 
placing the responsibility for devising, monitoring and providing a discrimination free 
work environment on public authorities. If the Gender Equality Duty proves to be 
effective, we should see the unexplained components of the gender gap fall in the 
public sector in the near future. As yet, there is no additional legislation covering the 
private sector. 
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Table 1.     Variable definitions. 
Variable name  Variable definition 
   
hourly pay  Average hourly pay [midpoints of 14 bands]] 
log hourly pay The natural log of average hourly pay 
  
Individual characteristics:  
potential experience (years) Age minus (approximate years of schooling plus 5), measured in years. 
training (days in previous year) Days of training in the previous twelve months [midpoints of 6 bars, top coded at 10 days] 
   
education measures;    
     none  Has none of the academic qualifications listed 
     other  Has other academic qualifications than those listed 
     cse25  Highest level of education is GCSE grades D-G; CSE grades 2-5 SCE; O grades D-; SCE Standard grades 4-7. 
     cse1 
 
Highest level of education is GCSE grades A-C; GCE O-level passes; CSE grade 1 SCE; O grades A-C; or SCE 
Standard 1-3 
    gceae  Highest level of education is GCE A-level grades A-E; 1-2 SCE; Higher grades A-C, As levels  
    gce2ae Highest level of education is 2 or more GCE; A-levels grades A-E; 3 or more SCE; or Higher grades A-C  
    degree Highest level of education is a first degree, eg BSc, BA, HND, HNC Ma at first degree level 
    postgrad Highest level of education is a higher degree, eg MSc, MA, PGCE, PhD 
child  Has a dependent child aged below 18  
married  Married or living with a partner  
disabled  Has a long term (>1 year) illness/disability  
ethnic 
 
Employee considers they are white and black Caribbean; white and black African; white and Asian;  any other mixed 
background; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background; Caribbean; African; any other black 
background; Chinese; or any other ethnic group. 
fixed contract  Employed on a fixed term contract  
hours  Usual hours worked per week (includes over time)  
full time Working full time,  if standard working hours is greater than 36 
tenure   Years at this workplace [midpoints of  5 bars, top coded at 10 years] 
union   Employee is a union member  
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Variable name  Variable definition 
   
occupation categories;   
     managerial    Managerial 
     professional    Professional 
     technical   Technical 
     clerical   Clerical  
     craft    Craft service 
     personal    Personal service 
     sales    Sales and customer services 
     operative    Operative and assembly workers 
     unskilled   Unskilled  
     
Workplace characteristics:   
public sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: government-owned limited 
company / nationalised industry/T); public service agency; other non-trading public corporation; quasi 
autonomous national government organisation (QUANGO); local/central government (inc. NHS and Local 
Education Authorities). 
private sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: public limited company (plc); 
private limited company; company limited by guarantee; partnership (inc. limited liability partnership/self-
prop); trust / charity; body established by royal charter; co-operative / mutual / friendly society.  
workplace size  Total number of employees in the workplace  
foreign owned  Foreign controlled workplace  
performance pay  Whether any employees in the workplace are paid by results or receive merit pay. 
pension provision  If employer provided pension is available to the largest occupation group in the workplace. 
equal opportunity  Workplace has a formal written equal opportunity policy   
family friendly index 
 
 Index of Six Family Friendly Policies available at the workplace: paternity leave; maternity leave; home 
working; job sharing; child care; paid leave. 
      paternity leave  If employees on paternity leave receives the normal, full rate of pay 
      maternity leave  If employees on maternity leave receives the normal, full rate of pay 
      home working  If employees can work at home 
      job sharing  If a job sharing scheme exists in the workplace 
      child care  If a workplace nursery or child care subsidy is available at the workplace 
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Variable name  Variable definition 
   
   
     paid leave   If paid family leave is available 
quality circles   Fraction of the workforce in quality circles  
team working   Fraction of workforce operating in formal work teams   
briefing system   Recognised system of briefing employees exists   
discretion over work   Has a lot of discretion over how  they work  
collective bargaining   If pay is set via collective bargaining   
grievance procedure   Collective grievance procedure present at the workplace  
   
regions:   
  north east    north east of England   
  north west    north west of England    
  yorkshire & the humberside    Yorkshire & the Humberside    
  east midlands    east midlands of England   
  west midlands    west midlands of England    
  east of england    east of England    
  london    London   
  south east    south east of England   
  south west    south west of England    
  scotland    Scotland    
  wales    Wales   
Source: WERS 2004. 
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Table 2. Sample means for the aggregate samples. 
               
 full sample  public  private  males  females 
 mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e. 
      
hourly pay 9.72 0.108  10.53 0.154  9.48 0.131  10.23 0.132  8.78 0.114 
log hourly pay 2.17 0.011  2.28 0.014  2.14 0.013  2.22 0.013  2.08 0.013 
potential experience 23.06 0.208  24.66 0.292  22.60 0.251  24.32 0.235  20.74 0.301 
potential exp squared 685.2 9.842  740.9 14.138  669.2 11.901  740.9 11.805  583.2 13.441 
dependent child 0.36 0.006  0.37 0.011  0.35 0.007  0.42 0.007  0.25 0.009 
married 0.67 0.006  0.70 0.012  0.66 0.007  0.71 0.007  0.61 0.010 
disabled 0.12 0.004  0.13 0.008  0.11 0.004  0.12 0.005  0.11 0.006 
ethnic 0.06 0.005  0.04 0.005  0.06 0.006  0.06 0.005  0.07 0.009 
education measures:               
    educ none 0.17 0.006  0.10 0.009  0.19 0.008  0.21 0.008  0.11 0.008 
    educ other 0.06 0.003  0.05 0.005  0.07 0.004  0.07 0.004  0.06 0.005 
     cse25 0.11 0.004  0.07 0.006  0.12 0.005  0.11 0.005  0.09 0.006 
     cse1 0.24 0.006  0.24 0.013  0.24 0.007  0.22 0.007  0.29 0.010 
     ceae 0.05 0.003  0.05 0.005  0.04 0.003  0.04 0.003  0.05 0.005 
     ce2ae 0.08 0.003  0.09 0.008  0.07 0.004  0.07 0.004  0.09 0.006 
    degree 0.21 0.007  0.26 0.015  0.19 0.008  0.20 0.008  0.22 0.009 
    postgraduate 0.07 0.004  0.11 0.009  0.06 0.005  0.07 0.005  0.07 0.005 
vocational qualification 0.61 0.008  0.69 0.014  0.58 0.009  0.60 0.010  0.62 0.011 
fixed contract 0.03 0.002  0.04 0.005  0.02 0.003  0.02 0.003  0.03 0.003 
training 2.70 0.056  3.79 0.111  2.39 0.063  2.55 0.066  2.97 0.075 
tenure 5.19 0.073  5.85 0.139  5.00 0.083  5.51 0.081  4.60 0.096 
union member 0.32 0.011  0.69 0.015  0.21 0.011  0.32 0.013  0.31 0.012 
occupations:               
    managerial  0.15 0.005  0.09 0.009  0.16 0.006  0.16 0.007  0.13 0.008 
    professional 0.11 0.006  0.20 0.014  0.09 0.007  0.12 0.007  0.11 0.007 
    technical 0.15 0.006  0.25 0.014  0.13 0.007  0.13 0.007  0.19 0.009 
   clerical 0.15 0.006  0.22 0.016  0.13 0.006  0.07 0.005  0.28 0.011 
   craft  0.11 0.007  0.05 0.014  0.12 0.008  0.16 0.010  0.01 0.004 
    personal  0.04 0.003  0.07 0.007  0.03 0.004  0.02 0.003  0.07 0.007 
    sales  0.06 0.005  0.01 0.003  0.07 0.007  0.04 0.004  0.09 0.009 
    operative  0.12 0.007  0.03 0.007  0.15 0.009  0.17 0.009  0.05 0.008 
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 full sample  public  private  males  females 
 mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e. 
      
    unskilled 0.11 0.007  0.09 0.013  0.11 0.008  0.13 0.009  0.05 0.006 
workplace size 513.90 57.7  1068.95 232.4  354.99 25.0  46942 45.9  595.02 88.7 
foreign owned 0.17 0.013   0.22 0.017  0.19 0.016  0.13 0.012 
performance pay 0.51 0.017  0.37 0.032  0.54 0.020  0.52 0.020  0.49 0.020 
pension provision 0.79 0.015  0.96 0.018  0.74 0.018  0.78 0.018  0.80 0.015 
equal opportunity 0.85 0.012  0.99 0.008  0.81 0.015  0.83 0.014  0.88 0.012 
family friendly index 2.96 0.050  4.39 0.063  2.55 0.055  2.83 0.059  3.19 0.052 
discretion over work 0.22 0.014  0.22 0.027  0.22 0.017  0.21 0.016  0.24 0.017 
quality circles 0.14 0.008  0.14 0.013  0.14 0.010  0.14 0.010  0.14 0.009 
team working 0.69 0.013  0.81 0.024  0.65 0.015  0.66 0.015  0.74 0.013 
briefing system 0.82 0.013  0.94 0.012  0.78 0.017  0.80 0.017  0.85 0.014 
collective bargaining 0.35 0.015  0.72 0.028  0.24 0.016  0.35 0.017  0.34 0.018 
grievance proc. 0.57 0.016  0.85 0.020  0.49 0.020  0.56 0.019  0.59 0.019 
regions:               
  north east 0.04 0.007  0.07 0.021  0.03 0.007  0.04 0.009  0.04 0.007 
  north west 0.15 0.013  0.15 0.025  0.15 0.015  0.15 0.014  0.15 0.016 
  yorkshire & the humberside 0.10 0.012  0.11 0.018  0.10 0.014  0.10 0.013  0.10 0.014 
  east midlands 0.08 0.009  0.07 0.015  0.08 0.011  0.08 0.010  0.07 0.011 
  west midlands 0.10 0.011  0.09 0.027  0.10 0.012  0.10 0.013  0.09 0.013 
  east of england 0.10 0.010  0.10 0.021  0.09 0.012  0.09 0.012  0.10 0.011 
  london 0.10 0.010  0.08 0.014  0.10 0.012  0.09 0.011  0.11 0.012 
  south east 0.13 0.012  0.12 0.021  0.13 0.014  0.12 0.014  0.13 0.013 
  south west 0.08 0.009  0.06 0.014  0.09 0.011  0.08 0.010  0.09 0.010 
  scotland 0.10 0.011  0.11 0.023  0.09 0.012  0.11 0.014  0.08 0.009 
  wales 0.04 0.006  0.06 0.013  0.03 0.006  0.04 0.006  0.04 0.007 
female 0.35 0.009  0.48 0.018  0.32 0.010       
public sector 0.22 0.011             
               
No. observations  10600   2903   7697   6695   3905 
Source: WERS 2004. 
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 Table 3.  Sample means by gender and sector.  
            
 male  female 
 public  private  public  private 
 mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.
    
hourly pay 10.97 0.222  10.07 0.155  10.06 0.150  8.22 0.145
log hourly pay 2.315 0.021  2.198 0.015  2.245 0.014  2.002 0.016
potential experience 26.22 0.406  23.91 0.270  22.96 0.409  19.78 0.385
potential exp squared 810.9 20.890  725.7 13.573  665.2 19.368  547.7 17.058
dependent child 0.45 0.017  0.41 0.008  0.27 0.015  0.23 0.011
married 0.75 0.014  0.69 0.008  0.65 0.017  0.59 0.013
disabled 0.14 0.012  0.12 0.005  0.13 0.011  0.10 0.007
ethnic 0.04 0.007  0.06 0.006  0.04 0.008  0.08 0.012
education measures:            
    educ none 0.14 0.015  0.22 0.009  0.06 0.008  0.14 0.011
    educ other 0.06 0.007  0.07 0.005  0.05 0.007  0.06 0.006
     cse25 0.09 0.010  0.12 0.006  0.05 0.006  0.11 0.008
     cse1 0.21 0.014  0.22 0.007  0.27 0.018  0.29 0.012
     ceae 0.05 0.006  0.04 0.003  0.07 0.008  0.05 0.005
     ce2ae 0.08 0.009  0.07 0.004  0.11 0.011  0.09 0.007
    degree 0.24 0.019  0.19 0.009  0.28 0.018  0.20 0.011
    postgraduate 0.11 0.013  0.06 0.006  0.12 0.012  0.05 0.006
vocational qualification. 0.67 0.019  0.58 0.011  0.71 0.016  0.58 0.014
fixed contract 0.03 0.006  0.02 0.003  0.05 0.007  0.02 0.004
training 3.56 0.162  2.33 0.072  4.04 0.111  2.50 0.092
tenure 6.34 0.162  5.33 0.090  5.32 0.165  4.29 0.111
union member 0.74 0.018  0.23 0.013  0.65 0.018  0.16 0.014
occupations:            
    managerial  0.12 0.012  0.17 0.008  0.07 0.010  0.15 0.010
    professional 0.16 0.017  0.11 0.008  0.24 0.017  0.06 0.007
    technical 0.24 0.022  0.11 0.007  0.25 0.016  0.17 0.012
    clerical 0.12 0.016  0.06 0.005  0.32 0.021  0.27 0.013
    craft  0.10 0.024  0.17 0.011  0.00 0.001  0.02 0.005
    personal  0.06 0.011  0.01 0.002  0.07 0.009  0.07 0.009
    sales  0.01 0.003  0.04 0.005  0.01 0.004  0.12 0.013
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 male  female 
 public  private  public  private 
 mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.  mean s.e.
    
    operative  0.05 0.012  0.19 0.011  0.00 0.002  0.07 0.012
    unskilled 0.14 0.021  0.13 0.010  0.03 0.006  0.07 0.008
workplace size  904.2 213.6  374.7 28.9  1247.6 270.4  312.17 23.4
foreign owned 0.00 0.000  0.24 0.019  0.00 0.000  0.19 0.017
performance pay 0.38 0.039  0.54 0.022  0.35 0.034  0.55 0.024
pension provision 0.96 0.027  0.74 0.021  0.96 0.011  0.74 0.021
equal opportunity 0.99 0.007  0.79 0.017  0.98 0.012  0.84 0.017
family friendly index 4.31 0.078  2.51 0.063  4.48 0.068  2.63 0.058
discretion over work 0.20 0.030  0.21 0.019  0.23 0.030  0.24 0.020
quality circles 0.12 0.014  0.14 0.012  0.15 0.015  0.14 0.012
team working 0.76 0.035  0.63 0.017  0.85 0.015  0.69 0.017
briefing system 0.94 0.016  0.77 0.020  0.94 0.015  0.81 0.019
collective bargaining 0.77 0.034  0.26 0.018  0.68 0.031  0.19 0.019
grievance proc. 0.86 0.024  0.50 0.022  0.84 0.022  0.48 0.024
regions:            
  north east 0.07 0.030  0.04 0.009  0.06 0.016  0.03 0.007
  north west 0.14 0.027  0.15 0.016  0.15 0.029  0.16 0.019
  yorkshire & the humberside 0.10 0.021  0.09 0.015  0.11 0.021  0.10 0.019
  east midlands 0.07 0.017  0.08 0.012  0.07 0.016  0.07 0.015
  west midlands 0.09 0.027  0.11 0.014  0.10 0.029  0.09 0.013
  east of england 0.07 0.021  0.10 0.014  0.12 0.025  0.09 0.012
  london 0.06 0.013  0.10 0.013  0.10 0.020  0.11 0.014
  south east 0.13 0.028  0.12 0.015  0.10 0.018  0.15 0.017
  south west 0.05 0.014  0.08 0.012  0.07 0.017  0.09 0.013
  scotland 0.15 0.037  0.10 0.015  0.08 0.016  0.08 0.011
  wales 0.06 0.018  0.03 0.006  0.05 0.012  0.04 0.009
            
No. observations  1489   5206   1414   2491
 Source: WERS 2004. 
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Table 4.  Within sector earnings functions. 
            
 male  female 
log hourly pay public  private  public  private 
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value
     
potential experience 0.017 4.72*  0.026 12.44*  0.016 4.19*  0.030 9.72*
potential exp squared (x1000) -0.220 -3.08*  -0.395 -9.71*  -0.250 -3.01*  -0.574 -8.56*
dependent child 0.054 2.72*  0.030 2.50*  0.028 1.42  -0.049 -2.36*
married 0.062 2.97*  0.081 5.98*  0.014 0.88  0.016 0.94
disabled -0.025 -1.26  -0.022 -1.35  -0.016 -0.68  -0.015 -0.62
ethnic 0.037 0.82  -0.108 -3.81*  -0.041 -0.64  -0.119 -3.58*
education (omitted category is none or other):          
     cse25 0.092 2.90*  0.060 3.23*  -0.007 -0.12  0.064 2.05*
     cse1 0.138 5.72*  0.092 5.13*  0.111 2.52*  0.096 4.05*
     ceae 0.079 1.02  0.099 3.31*  0.169 2.47*  0.122 2.43*
     ce2ae 0.215 6.67*  0.218 8.89*  0.182 3.17*  0.179 5.15*
    degree 0.266 10.18*  0.315 13.69*  0.255 5.05*  0.341 10.37*
    postgraduate 0.455 9.09*  0.415 12.11*  0.296 5.29*  0.377 9.39*
vocational qualification 0.032 1.81  0.043 3.45*  0.011 0.49  0.056 3.46*
fixed contract 0.035 0.74  -0.099 -1.69  -0.080 -1.21  -0.050 -0.88
training 0.002 0.85  0.002 1.09  0.006 2.26*  0.006 2.28*
tenure 0.013 4.79*  0.010 5.18*  0.013 4.39*  0.010 3.61*
union member 0.004 0.18  0.003 0.17  -0.004 -0.23  0.015 0.64
occupations (omitted category is crafts):          
    managerial  0.222 5.97*  0.259 12.23*  0.379 2.23*  0.299 4.98*
    professional 0.136 2.78*  0.219 8.31*  0.334 1.93  0.367 5.35*
    technical 0.145 3.75*  0.114 4.69*  0.207 1.22  0.235 4.17*
    clerical -0.062 -1.26  0.041 1.41  0.025 0.15  0.118 2.22*
    personal  -0.148 -3.60*  -0.209 -4.99*  -0.053 -0.30  -0.166 -2.79*
    sales  -0.012 -0.12  -0.217 -6.62*  -0.005 -0.03  -0.056 -0.97
    operative  -0.183 -2.23*  -0.147 -6.80*  -0.045 -0.19  -0.052 -0.90
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 male  Female 
 public  private  public  private 
            
 coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value
    unskilled -0.275 -6.40*  -0.290 -11.48*  -0.135 -0.77  -0.132 -2.21*
workplace size (/1000) 0.003 0.81  0.013 1.05  0.006 1.75  0.022 1.87
foreign owned     0.029 1.53      0.040 1.65
performance pay 0.025 0.99  0.056 3.11*  0.016 0.86  0.043 2.10*
pension provision -0.069 -1.19  0.057 2.53*  0.026 0.56  0.073 3.04*
equal opportunity 0.011 0.13  -0.011 -0.47  -0.035 -0.97  -0.035 -1.25
family friendly index 0.007 0.58  0.025 3.77*  0.026 3.42*  0.023 3.14*
discretion over work -0.003 -0.12  0.022 1.04  0.032 1.46  0.035 1.52
quality circles 0.044 0.72  -0.008 -0.25  0.018 0.53  -0.001 -0.02
team working -0.013 -0.42  0.048 1.99*  -0.044 -1.32  0.087 3.14*
briefing system 0.092 1.83  0.016 0.68  -0.004 -0.14  0.011 0.40
collective bargaining 0.025 0.96  0.066 2.99*  0.024 1.21  0.038 1.37
grievance proc. 0.027 0.74  -0.036 -1.85  -0.001 -0.02  -0.040 -2.01*
regions (omitted category is east midlands):          
  north east -0.023 -0.47  -0.008 -0.15  -0.024 -0.48  -0.069 -1.13
  north west -0.058 -0.86  -0.013 -0.33  0.015 0.36  -0.052 -1.06
  yorkshire & the humberside -0.061 -1.60  0.046 1.20  0.023 0.53  -0.004 -0.07
  west midlands 0.066 1.56  0.021 0.53  -0.007 -0.17  -0.036 -0.71
  east of england 0.050 1.11  0.095 2.29*  0.083 1.90  -0.001 -0.01
  london 0.207 3.99*  0.237 6.13*  0.239 5.05*  0.256 5.00*
  south east 0.121 2.18*  0.144 3.87*  0.071 1.46  0.080 1.48
  south west -0.014 -0.29  0.030 0.79  -0.017 -0.36  0.017 0.33
  scotland 0.029 0.63  0.012 0.26  0.057 1.33  -0.019 -0.34
  wales 0.009 0.16  0.057 1.12  0.007 0.14  -0.096 -1.43
constant 1.523 15.18*  1.349 25.63*  1.467 7.92*  1.177 14.04*
            
No. observations  1489   5206   1414   2491
R squared  0.5539   0.5680   0.4820   0.5396
Source: WERS 2004. * Significant at a confidence level of 95% or above. 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of the Earnings Gaps - Comparing Public and Private Sectors. 
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Unexplained 7.43 lpp      4.68 lpp Unexplained 
 
 
Notes: 
Source: WERS 2004. Each total bilateral earnings gap is presented next to an arrow indicating the direction of the comparison.  
In each case the contribution of each group of variables is evaluated using the parameters from the model  
for the lower earnings group. All figures are expressed in log-percentage points.  
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